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Abstract
In this paper, we compare single and joint evaluation (JE) of competing public
sector programmes in a contingent valuation exercise. Using survey data aimed
at evaluating WTP for cancer interventions (n = 2628), we disantangle two types
of effects of JE: informational effects and sequence effects. By the former, we
mean: by presenting different programmes to respondents, they will acquire more
information on each programme than they would if each programme was valued
in isolation. Sequence effects are underisable and induced by the JE exercise
itself: changing the order of the valuation sequence induces different WTP values.
Our results show that there are informational effects but no sequence effects. We
therefore argue that JE approaches can be added to the armoury of techniques
aimed at designing better survey instruments in a way that induces informational
effects without incurring problems of sequencing.
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1 Introduction
In many areas of public sector activity, several programmes will be competing for avail-
able funds at the margin. With no price data revealed from real choices to guide society
to an efficient equilibrium, contingent valuation has emerged as the main method for
completing the ’market’ by aiding decisions on allocations across such programmes. In
general, this process of completion is achieved through appropriately targeted groups
of respondents (whether it be particular user groups or members of the general public)
being asked about their maximum willingness to pay (WTP) for each of the programmes
at stake.
This raises the question, however, of whether the process of completion is better
achieved through a separate evaluation (SE) process, whereby different groups of re-
spondents are each asked to value just one of the rival programmes, or a joint evaluation
(JE) process, whereby all respondents value each of the rivals.
Although there may be obvious practical reasons of cost in favour of JE, it poses both
theoretical and econometric challenges. On the former, standard economic theory might
state that WTP values arising from both SE and JE procedures would be equivalent.
However, this would ignore theoretical developments related to reference points and
other explanations of preference reversals. Despite appearing as challenges to JE, it
may be that such aspects are in fact better exploited in the JE situation, especially in
the presence of imperfectly informed consumers (or respondents). On the latter, more
thorough econometric procedures need to be used to test whether JE is indeed different
to, and an improvement on, SE.
This paper reports the results of an experiment aimed at addressing these two issues.
In the following section, a brief review of the literature and theoretical exposition of the
potential differences between the SE and JE approaches reveals more clearly the need for
the experiment conducted. This is followed by a description of the survey, experimental
design and econometric testing procedures used to compare SE and JE. The results,
discussion and conclusions then follow respectively.
2 Background and theory
Already reviewed by Bazerman et al. (1999), much previous literature comparing SE
and JE has, for the most part, sought to determine whether preference reversals arise
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in situations in which one choice conveys a financial gain to the respondent, but in a
scenario where s/he is worse off than his/her peers, whilst the alternative conveys a
smaller financial gain, but with peer parity. Of course, other studies have also used JE
and SE comparisons to examine similar sets of choices between consumer goods and
part-whole biases (Hsee 1996; Hsee 1998; Hoehn and Randall 1989). Sequencing effects,
too, have been thoroughly examined using JE approaches (Carson et al. 1998).
However, in the study reported here, SE and JE approaches are used to compare
health goods for which there would be no prior expectation on the part of the analyst
on preference orderings, whether viewed by the respondent from the perspective of
efficiency or equality. This is similar to work examining whether people would express
their support for government intervention in the case of very diverse and clearly mutually
exclusive ’goods’ such as treating skin cancer in farm workers or preserving a rare species
of animal (Kahneman and Ritov 1994).
In the context of public sector decision making, where several alternatives are com-
peting for limited funds, it would seem natural to expose a sample of the relevant con-
stituency of respondents to descriptions of all of the alternatives requiring assessment
and to ask all respondents to value each alternative. In this respect, JE would seem
to offer several practical and theoretical advantages. First, it places the respondent in
the same position as the decision maker in having to choose directly between several
alternatives on offer at any one point in time. Secondly, it mimics a market situation in
which the consumer is continuously weighing up the benefits of different goods.
This latter point indicates a further strength; that is that JE also avoids the more
complex cognitive task associated with SE in which the respondent has to generate
internal referents, all of which may also differ across such respondents, when assessing the
single option put to them for valuation (Kahneman and Ritov 1994). It could be argued
that providing respondents with a clearer idea of the alternatives to be compared in an
evaluation, through a JE approach, will standardise the reference point. By focussing
on what Bazerman et al. (1999) describe as "the comparison set for evaluation", a more
discriminatory result is likely to arise than simply asking different groups to value just
one programme each. For example, in the case of the study reported on in this paper,
in which different cancer programmes are assessed, respondents valuing one programme
may simply compare this to no programme at all, or even worse, either register a token
amount as a ’vote’ for cancer or use an unobserved reference point. The ’noise’ generated
by such behaviour has led in the past to results of several WTP studies not being
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able to discriminate between options evaluated and has led to a call for JE approaches
(Johannesson and Fegeberg 1992; Ryan et al. 1997; Donaldson et al. 1995).
More formally, according to standard consumer theory, one would expect that values
elicited under each procedure would be equal. Consider a simple model where an indi-
vidual derives utility from his/er income y and his/er health h and consider further that
his/er health depends upon health care provision. When a particular health programme,
say A, is provided in a SE exercise, his/er WTP for this health programme is usually
defined as
U(y, h0) = U(y −WTP sA, h(A|A)) (1)
where h0 is individual’s health state with the current level of care, the subscript s
indicates that the WTP is elicited in a SE exercise and h(A|A) is the health state
reached when A is provided. With this formulation we also want to indicate that the
agent’s evaluation of programme A on her health will reflect only the consideration of
this particular health programme as in standard SE exercises.
Now consider that two mutually exclusive programmes, say A and B1, are provided
in a JE exercise and let us focus on WTP for programme A. The respondent is asked to
value programme A, but before that, s/he has also been provided with the description
of the other programme B. As in the previous scenario, one can derive his WTP for
programme A so that
U(y, h0) = U(y −WTP dA, h(A|A,B)) (2)
where the subscript d indicates that agent’s WTP for programme A is obtained in a JE
of two mutually exclusive health programmes. For the sake of simplicity, consider that
his/er utility is additively separable, so that U(y, h) = g(y) + u(h), where g(.) and u(.)
are standard monotonic increasing concave functions. This leads to
g(y)− g(y −WTP sA) = u(h(A|A))− u(h0) and
g(y)− g(y −WTP dA) = u(h(A|A,B))− u(h0)
(3)
The difference between the two equations is
g(y −WTP dA)− g(y −WTP sA) = u(h(A|A))− u(h(A|A,B)). (4)
1By mutually exclusive programmes, we consider health programmes that cannot technically be
provided jointly such as, for instance, two surgical techniques, or health programmes that are made
experimentally mutually exclusive – that is, one or the other programme is said to be available but not
both. In doing so, we thus avoid potential substitution or complementary effects that would put on an
additional layer of difficulties for the experimental study. We of course do not deny their relevance for
decision-making in health care.
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It is obvious that the WTP for programme A is identical in the SE and JE exercise
if u(h(A|A)) = u(h(A|A,B).2 In other words, this would mean that the addition of
another programme B to the evaluation exercise does not have any effect on the agent’s
evaluation of A. This is indeed the case of a standard perfectly informed and rational
individual. This will be the null hypothesis that we are going to test.
If it turns out that this hypothesis does not hold and people will respond differently
in SE and JE evaluations, then one can argue that, first, the presence or not of another
programme B has an “informational effect” on people’s valuations. By an informational
effect we mean: by presenting programme A to individuals, they will come to learn what
effect this programme has on their health. The same is true when they are presented
with programme B. However, in addition to this “direct” information, individuals will
acquire two further “indirect” types of "information”; namely, first, what is the difference
on health of programme A and B and, second, by understanding this difference, they
will also understand better the respective impact of each of the programmes on their
health (Protière et al. 2004). If it is assumed that health care consumers are not
well informed, it would follow that they are more likely, in the SE situation, to choose
different and even inappropriate reference points, relative to the JE situation in which
a relevant alternative is presented and for which a valuation is also asked for. Second,
the null hypothesis may not hold because of differences between SE and JE induced by
the JE exercise itself. This would amount to “sequence effects” as described by Payne
et al. (2000) and Stewart et al. (2002). That is, changing the order in which the WTP
is elicited for different programmes will have an impact on people’s valuations.
Econometrically, there are techniques that should be used to estimate WTP values
obtained in the context of a JE procedure and, thus, test more thoroughly the above
hypotheses. In most previous studies, values have been estimated as though they are
independent of each other (Donaldson et al. 1997; Olsen and Donaldson 1998). How-
ever, such estimations do not account for the JE procedure exogenously providing a
reference structure for respondents which may influence their WTP valuations of each
programme. This issue was investigated in an earlier study in which WTP values, sev-
eral of which were derived from each respondent, were estimated as though independent
(using ordinary least squares) and within a simultaneous equation framework (using
seemingly unrelated regressions, or SUR) (Luchini et al. 2003). The main results of
2One could also think that the respondent’s valuation of health given the current level of care, u(h0),
depends either on the presence of A only or on A and B together in the evaluation exercise. That would
lead to comparison of variations of utility instead of levels but would not change the conclusion.
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this study were that independent estimation led to misspecification and that the use of
SUR improved the efficiency of WTP estimates. However, the main conclusion was that
this should be tested further in an experimental situation in which respondents would
be randomly allocated to a SE or JE elicitation procedure. It is the result of such an
experiment that is reported in this paper and which can further inform us as to these
two important issues. In the following section of the paper, this experiment is described
along with a more formal outline of the econometric analysis strategy.
3 Survey design and data
In a survey dealing with "knowledge and behaviors toward cancer", conducted dur-
ing April-June 2005 by the National Institute of Prevention and Education for Health
(INPES), 4046 members of the general population, 16 years of age and over, were inter-
viewed by phone (Guilbert et al. 2006). One part of the questionnaire was dedicated to
the contingent valuation study reported on here.
In this study WTP values were elicited for three health programmes on colorectal
cancer, this being the second most diagnosed cancer in western nations (Ferlay et al.
2004). The three health programmes to be valued each represent different aspects of
care within cancer; a “screening programme”, a “new treatment programme” and a “re-
habilitation programme” which we later refer to as programmes A, B and C respectively
(see Appendix A for a complete description of each).
In order to compare SE and JE, some randomly-selected respondents had to perform
a WTP evaluation for only one of these three programmes while others had to perform a
JE of two of these three programmes. A comparison of WTP values obtained in SE and
JE will allow us to test our null hypothesis of no difference between SE and JE. Moreover,
if it turns out that some differences appear, all combinations of two programmes were
evaluated in a different sequence in order to distinguish between the informational effect
assumption and the sequence effect assumption. There were therefore three SE exercises
of programmes A, B and C and six JE exercises: AB, BA, BC, CB, AC and CA.
More specifically, after explaining the purpose of the exercise, respondents were pre-
sented with description(s) of the programme(s) to be valued. Note that our design
differs from Payne et al. (2000). In their study, Payne et al. (2000) informed re-
spondents that they would evaluate five different programmes. However, information
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on each programme was not provided prior to the evaluation exercise but sequentially.
Namely, the information on a particular programme was provided when the respondent
was asked his WTP for the programme. Such a methodological choice can undermine
the distinction between informational effects and sequence effects without any additional
assumptions.
In the JE exercise, respondents were first asked to rank the two health programmes
submitted for valuation. Then, WTP values were elicited using a two-step procedure.
Firstly, the respondent was asked whether s/he would be willing to pay, and, if so,
what would be the maximum amount in terms of a yearly additional contribution to
the Sickness Fund of the French Social Security, the main financing scheme for health
care in France. If respondents were not willing to pay, they were asked why using a
pre-coded list of six alternative reasons. This allowed us to distinguish between ’true’
zeros and ’protest’ answers. Those who stated that they did not want to contribute
because ’The other programme is more valuable’, ’I can’t afford it’, ’I’m not concerned
by this programme’ were considered as true zeros. Those who gave other reasons were
classified as protestors (see Protière et al. 2004 and Olsen et al. 2005). In cases of a
protest answer for only one of the two programmes in the JE, the following rule has been
applied. When there is a true zero and a protest answer, the respondent is considered
as a protestor; when there is a positive value for one programme and a protest reason
for the other, the missing value was replaced by a "zero", on the assumption that, if the
respondent has given a value to one programme, s/he could not be seen as a protestor
and then could not be excluded from the sample.3.
All respondents who were willing to contribute were asked the following question:
’Knowing that your contribution would reduce what you have left to spend on other
things, how much would you be willing to contribute each year for this programme?’
Because it was a phone survey and to facilitate answers, the following pre-coded scale
was used: less than 10AC, 10 to 30AC, 31 to 50AC, 51 to 75AC, 76 to 100AC, 101 to 150AC, and
more than 150AC. The middle of each range was used to represent a respondent’s value.
In order to avoid any substitution or complementary effect in the JE exercise, before
eliciting WTP for the second programme, respondents were informed that "the first
programme was no longer a candidate for funding", thus rendering the programmes
mutually exclusive.
Questions about respondents’ socio-demographic characteristics, health behaviors,
3As in Luchini et al. (2003) a simultaneous estimation can be performed only on complete data set.
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experience of cancer in general and of colorectal cancer in particular for members of
family as well as own experience of screening were included in the questionnaire. Three
scores are derived from some of these questions: two behavior scores and a score about
the perception that respondents have of their own level of information toward factors
that could influence health. "Healthy Attitude" and the "Non Healthy Attitude" scores
(ScoreHB and ScoreNHB respectively) have been constructed on the base of 13 questions
about (un)healthy lifestyle. That is to say, the scales were based on some objective
factors that would reduce (raise) cancer risk, such as behaviors toward tobacco, alcohol
(frequency, number of glasses, ...), sun (use of cream, cap, exposition hours), physical
activity and nutrition. For the healthy attitude (resp. non healthy attitude) score, one
point was allocated for each answer that reflected the more (resp. less) healthy attitude
.
The "Non Informed" score (ScoreNI) was built with five questions about perception
of information on alcohol effect, tobacco effect, cancer, alimentation and risk linked with
sun exposition on health. For these five points the question was ’Do you feel you are
very well; rather well; rather badly or very badly informed?’. To build the score, one
point was allocated when the answer was ’badly’ or ’very badly informed’.
4 Econometric model
Consider first the WTP of respondents in the SE exercise. In this case, the WTP W sij
of respondent i, i = 1 . . . n, for programme j, j = A,B,C, is defined
W sij = Xiβj + 
s
ij (5)
where Xi is a vector of explanatory variables, βj a vector of parameters specific to
programme j and ij a well-behaved error term with mean zero and standard error σsj
that accounts for heterogeneity of tastes in the population.
In the joint evaluation case, the respondent evaluates sequentially, in the same ques-
tionnaire two health programmes j and k. S/he states a willingness to pay for each of
the programmesW dij andW dik. As these willingness to pay values are elicited in the same
CV exercise, we consider the following system of equationsW dij = W sij + γkj + dijW dik = W sik + γjk + dik (6)
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These equations state that the wilingness to pay in a joint evaluation context is a
combination between that which would be obtained in a single valuation framework
and specific effects induced by the joint valuation procedure. Typically, the description
of another health programme in the evaluation exercise may influence a respondent’s
answer to the other programme and willingness to pay values can differ in the single and
joint evaluation exercise. Namely, the parameter γkj (resp. γ
j
k) stands for the impact on
respondents’ valuations of programme j (resp. k) when he also evaluates programme k
(resp. j). Hereafter, these effects are called informational effects.
One might also consider that some sequence effects can occur. In our setting, the
evaluation task required respondents to state their WTP for a pair of programmes j
and k in different orders, either j first and k second (system 6) or k first and j second.
In the latter case, the system of equations becomesW dik = W sik + γ
j
k + δ
kj
k + 
d
ik
W dij = W
s
ij + γ
k
j + δ
kj
j + 
d
ij
(7)
where δkjk and δ
kj
j stand for the impact on WTP of evaluating programme k first and
programme j second (referent is evaluating programme j first and programme k second).
With three programmes A, B and C, the effects on WTP values of evaluating two
programmes in JE instead of SE can be summarized as follows:
θA = γ
B
A + γ
C
A + δ
BA
A + δ
CA
A
θB = γ
A
B + γ
C
B + δ
BA
B + δ
CB
B
θC = γ
A
C + γ
B
C + δ
CA
C + δ
CB
C
(8)
The first two parameters in each equation stand for the impact on WTP values of
evaluating jointly a second programme (with respect to evaluating only one programme
in SE). The last two parameters stand for sequence effects that may occur in a JE that
deals with pairs of programmes. It is then possible to define two nested hypothesis.
First, when the informational effects are accounted for, thanks to the γ parameters, we
can test for the presence of additional sequence effects by testing the nullity of the δ
parameters:
H1 (no sequence effects): δBCA = δCAA = δBAB = δCBB = δCAC = δCAC = 0
A joint statistical test of nullity of this hypothesis and the γ parameters allows us to
test our main assumption, that is SE and JE yield identical WTP values:
H0 (no difference between SE and JE): H1 and γBA = γCA = γAB = γCB = γAC = γBC = 0
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It remains us to define the properties of the error terms dA, dB and dC . The standard
error of each of the error terms is defined as follows:
σdA = σ
s
A + αA
σdB = σ
s
B + αB
σdC = σ
s
C + αC
(9)
where σSA, σSB and σSC are the standard errors computed when WTP values are obtained
in SE and αA, αB and αC are additional parameters introduced when programmes
are evaluated in JE. Such a specification is two-fold. First it allows us to test for
the different variances of WTP values in SE and JE. Second, it allows for some form of
heteroscedasticity induced by estimated together WTP values elicited in SE and JE that,
if not taken into account, may undermine statistical inference on our main hypothesis
H0 and H1.
Finally, we consider the potential correlations that may occur between error terms in
JE by specifying the following covariance matrix:
Σjk =
[
(σdj )
2 σjk
σjk (σ
d
k)
2
]
(10)
where σjk, j = A,B,C, k = A,B,C, is a covariance parameter that accounts for stochas-
tic correlation between W dij and W dik. Under the assumption that the error terms are
normally distributed, the model can be estimated by maximum likelihood using a bivari-
ate normal distribution (three indeed, one for each pair of programmes). Note that the
variance-covariance matrix of one particular contribution to the loglikelihood depends
on which combination jk the respondent had to evaluate. For instance, the contribution
to the likelihood of a respondent who performed a joint evaluation of programme A first
and B second is:
LABi = φ
(
wiA −XiβA − γBA , wiB −XiβB − γAB ,ΣAB
)
(11)
where φ is the density of the normal bivariate distribution and ΣAB the variance co-
variance matrix of the joint evaluation (A,B). When the respondent performed a single
evaluation exercise, his contribution to the likelihood is simply Lji = φ(wij −Xiβj, σ2j )
with j = A,B,C. Where φ in this case is the density of the univariate normal distribu-
tion.
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Evaluation exercise Programme A Programme B Programme C
A Mean WTP (SD) 28.57 (±31.8) - -
n = 260 Nb of true zero 24 (9.2%)
Nb of prostestors 105 (40.4%)
B Mean WTP (SD) - 28.45 (±35.5) -
n = 291 Nb of true zero 43 (14.8%)
Nb of protestors 84 (28.9%)
C Mean WTP (SD) - - 32.46 (±34.8)
n = 281 Nb of true zero 29 (10.3%)
Nb of protestors 96 (34.2%)
AB Mean WTP (SD) 34.55 (±37.4) 30.16 (±33.9) -
n = 487 Nb of true zero 56 (11.5%) 73 (14.9%)
Nb of protestors 121 (24.8%) 121 (24.8%)
BA Mean WTP (SD) 35.4 (±36.6) 30.62 (±37.9) -
n = 463 Nb of true zero 40 (8.6%) 93 (20.1%)
Nb of protestors 118 (25.5%) 118 (25.5%)
BC Mean WTP (SD) - 32.98 (±36.3) 32.44 (±35.3)
n = 466 Nb of true zero 56 (12.0%) 52 (11.2%)
Nb of protestors 134 (28.8%) 134 (28.8%)
CB Mean WTP (SD) - 34.59 (±39.1) 35.36 (±38.7)
n = 492 Nb of true zero 58 (11.8%) 57 (11.6%)
Nb of protestors 137 (27.8%) 137 (27.8%)
AC Mean WTP (SD) 35.17 (±36.6) - 26.87 (±32.3)
n = 472 Nb of true zero 32 (6.8%) 69 (14.6%)
Nb of protestors 133 (28.2%) 133 (28.2%)
CA Mean WTP (SD) 34.06 (±35.8) - 28.94 (±34.9)
n = 458 Nb of true zero 43 (9.4%) 76 (15.7%)
Nb of protestors 114 (24.9%) 114 (24.9%)
Table 1: WTP statistics, true zeros and protests by evaluation exercise (n = 3670)
5 Empirical results
Among the 4046 respondents, 226 (5.6%) had been cured for a cancer and were ex-
cluded from the survey. 150 (3.7%) additional respondents were excluded because they
did not complete the questionnaire. The table in Appendix B presents characteristics of
the 3670 respondents and a comparison between the 2628 (71.6%) contributors and the
protestors. A number of significant differences could be observed between contributors
and protestors. However no differences were found in terms of education, income, or
experience of cancer. Some of the significant differences could be seen as not surpris-
ing, in particular three variables that could be seen as proxies of a high concern with
health and of having some form of private protection, such as having subscribed to pri-
vate health insurance, being vaccinated against grip and having a higher score on the
healthy attitude scale. These respondents could be less willing to contribute to publicly
funded programmes because they already perceive themselves as having greater levels
of protection. A similar explanation could run for the higher proportion of respondents
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having experimented an hemocult test,4 among protestors, in the sense that some of
them could feel less concerned by programmes about colorectal cancer with which they
have already experimented.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on WTP values, numbers of true zero and
protestors according to the evaluation exercise: 832 (22.7%) respondents were included
in the SE exercise and 2838 in the JE exercise. The main first observation could be
that for programme A (screening) and B (treatment) the WTP values are higher in
JE exercise than in the SE, whatever is the combination. On the other hand, WTP
values for programme C (rehabilitation) are quite similar when evaluated alone or with
treatment B but lower in SE then when evaluated with programme A.
For the sake of readability, econometric results are presented into two separate tables.
Table 2 presents the parameter estimates associated with the covariates that explain
WTP values for each of the three programmes. Table 3 presents the coefficients more
specifically dedicated to the JE study. Consider first the parameter estimates associated
with respondents’ characteristics. Table 2 shows us that four variables are significant
for all three programmes: being a male (MALE), income (INCOME), having a member
of the family with an experience of cancer and having already done an hemocult test
(EXPHEMO). All variables have a positive (but different) impact on WTP values.
Some other variables have a significant positive impact on WTP values for programmes
A and B only: healthy behavior score (ScoreHB), Non informed Score (ScoreNI) and
having a family member with cancer (FAMILYK). Lastly, some variables are specific
to one programme only. Being a smoker (SMOKER) have a positive impact on WTP
values for programme A. Two variables are significant and have a positive impact for
programme B only: living in a rural area (RURAL) and having an University degree
(EDUC4).
Table 3 presents the parameter estimates associated with JE. The first three rows
presents the covariance parameters between programmes. They are all highly significant
and positive. This indicates that the independence assumption is not sustainable. Mor-
ever, the positiveness of these covariance coefficients means that the higher the value
attached to one programme in a combination the higher will be the value for the other
programme. The variance effects are also all highly significant and positive. Variances
of WTP values are therefore significantly higher when elicited in JE rather than in SE.
This effect is however less important for programme C.
4The hemocult test is a screening test for colorectal cancer.
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Variable Parameter estimates
(p-value)
Programme A Programme B Programme C
Constant 11.0660 7.0887 21.8582
(0.138) (0.338) (0.007)
MALE 3.2292?? 5.4650??? 4.5580??
(0.032) (0.000) (0.012)
AGE -0.2900 -0.3753 -0.4212
(0.304) (0.153) (0.148)
AGE2 0.0024 0.0035 0.0040
(0.459) (0.214) (0.218)
INCOME 0.0047??? 0.0037??? 0.0033???
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EMPL 2.7412 0.5593 2.1572
(0.192) (0.793) (0.306)
NBPERS -0.6361 0.2604 0.3814
(0.442) (0.754) (0.667)
NB16 1.1862 1.0732 0.5097
(0.415) (0.433) (0.698)
HERED 5.5099?? 6.6288??? 3.8961??
(0.014) (0.001) (0.150)
FAMILYK 2.5853? 2.8172? 2.2690
(0.075) (0.071) (0.163)
SMOKER 4.5023??? 1.9197 2.6879
(0.009) (0.298) (0.137)
ScoreHB 1.0911??? 1.0547?? 0.4714
(0.010) (0.023) (0.270)
ScoreNHB -0.4059 1.0187? -0.2962
(0.532) (0.098) (0.653)
scoreNI 1.4839??? 1.0687?? 0.5323
(0.007) (0.042) (0.376)
MUTUELLE -3.1692 -0.1531 -0.1039
(0.191) (0.962) (0.971)
EXPHEMO 7.1765??? 7.6852??? 4.7652?
(0.002) (0.000) (0.055)
VGRIPPE -1.0838 -3.2871 -1.2874
(0.607) (0.134) (0.555)
RURAL 2.1936 4.6081??? 1.4564
(0.165) (0.004) (0.411)
EDUC2 -1.1811 -1.6083 -3.3227
(0.576) (0.462) (0.145)
EDUC3 -0.2637 1.6115 -0.4686
(0.902) (0.481) (0.840)
EDUC3 2.2011 5.9967??? 0.2819
(0.475) (0.030) (0.928)
Std Error σj 17.1200 20.7268 32.7514
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Loglikelihood 22231.608
??? if p-value<0.01, ?? if p-value<0.05, ? if p-value<0.1
Table 2: Econometric results - covariates coefficients (n = 2628)
The last six lines of Table 3 presents the parameter estimates for the informational
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Coefficients
Parameter p-value
estimates
Covariances
σAB 1501.039??? (0.000)
σAC 1405.553??? (0.000)
σBC 1379.447??? (0.000)
Variance effects
αA 26.7940??? (0.000)
αB 21.9441??? (0.000)
αC 6.4142??? (0.001)
Informational effects
on WTP for programme A when elicited with
8<: programme B: γBAprogramme C: γCA
6.2016?? (0.022)
6.2735?? (0.024)
on WTP for programme B when elicited with
8<: programme A: γABprogramme C: γCB
2.1210 (0.426)
4.8213? (0.081)
on WTP for programme C when elicited with
8<: programme A: γACprogramme B: γBC
-4.2954 (0.182)
1.5059 (0.668)
Sequence effects
on WTP for programme A when elicited in
8<:sequence BA: δBAAsequence CA: δCAA
0.7807 (0.851)
0.6065 (0.879)
on WTP for programme B when elicited in
8<:sequence BA: δBABsequence CB: δCBB
0.2390 (0.957)
2.8903 (0.434)
on WTP for programme C when elicited in
8<:sequence CA: δCACsequence CB: δCBC
1.7621 (0.656)
2.4509 (0.471)
??? if p-value<0.01, ?? if p-value<0.05, ? if p-value<0.1
Table 3: Econometric results - JE effects (n = 2628)
effects and the sequence effects potentially induced by JE. Consider first the informa-
tional effects. Three of them are significant and positive: γBA (p = .022), γCA (p = .024)
and γCB , although less significantly (p = .081). WTP for the screening programme A
is therefore more likely to be higher when elicited with programme B or C. Similarly,
WTP for the treatment programme B is more likely to increase when jointly evaluated
with the rehabilitation programme C. On the contrary, eliciting jointly programme B
together with the screening programme A or C with another programme, whatever it is,
does not yield different WTP values in comparison with SE. Concerning the sequence
effects, that is δ coefficients, none of them pass the significance test individually.
We finally focus on the tests of our main assumptions H0 and H1. We do so by
estimating two restricted models in order to test for the presence of sequence effects
H1 and the absence of any mean effect induced by the joint evaluation procedure H0.5
5These constrained models keep with different variances between SE and JE. Given the high signif-
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This allows us to compute LR tests. Results are two-fold. First, we cannot reject the
null hypothesis H1 of no sequence effect: LR=3.20 with p-value=.800. Second, the LR
test for the complete model against the null hypothesis H0 of no differences between SE
and JE is: LR=16.45 with p-value<0.0001. We therefore reject the null of no difference
between SE and JE. In our data, we thus conclude that, although the JE exercise leads
to different WTP values due to informational effects, it does not induce sequence effects.
6 Discussion
Two main aspects of our results are expected and, to an extent, confirm the validity of
the exercise conducted. These are the relationships between income and WTP and also
those with cancer experience who were willing to pay registering higher WTP values.
With respect to the main issue of SE versus JE, we can say three things. First,
there is a difference between WTP values that arise in the SE and JE situations. This
is, in itself, an important matter of concern for public decision making. Second, the
econometric results have shown that this is due neither to heterogeneity in respondents
nor to sequencing effects. Third, and following on from the second point, these results
are important because they highlight the main possibility of differences between JE and
SE being due to informational effects; in line with economic theory, it could be argued
that this is because respondents were provided with infomation on another alternative
when making their evaluation in the JE situation. Looking back at programme A relative
to B as an example, in the SE situation it might be that respondents simply register
a ’vote’ for each of A and B relative to a reference point which is either random or
zero, resulting in similar WTP values. In the JE situation, respondents see the relevant
competing programmes and correspondingly provide more discriminating WTP values.
The isolation of informational effects has not been shown before, previous studies mixing
such effects with those arising from sequencing.
Of course, the example provided in the previous paragraph is speculative. Although
we, as well as others, have argued in favour of a JE approach as a way of ’completing
the market’, more systematic research is required in order to assess the reproducability
and relevance of the informational effects we have isolated.
icance of the additional variance terms αA, αB and αC in JE, we would obviously reject a constrained
model with identical variances in SE and JE and therefore not be able to disantangle variance and
mean effects induced by JE.
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7 Conclusion
The shortcomings of CV when measured against the market are well acknowledged and
have received much attention, focussing on issues such as hypothetical bias for example.
Innovatory methods, such as ’cheap talk’ (Cummings and Taylor 1999; Aadland and
Caplan 2006; K. et al. 2008) and group-evaluation procedures (Alvarez-Farizo and Han-
ley 2006) have been devised, and with some success, to alleviate such challenges. These
innovations are not mutually exclusive, however. In this study, we have demonstrated
the potential for JE approaches to be added to this armoury in a way that induces
informational effects without incurring problems of sequencing.
16
References
Aadland, David and Arthur J. Caplan (2006). Cheap talk reconsidered: New evidence
from CVM. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 60, 562–578.
Alvarez-Farizo, B. and N. Hanley (2006). Improving the process of valuing non-market
benefits: combining citizens’ juries with choice modelling. Land Economics, 82,
465–478.
Bazerman, M., D. Moore, A. Tenbrunsel, K. Wade-benzoni, and S. Blount (1999). Ex-
plaining how preferences change across joint versus separate evaluation. Journal of
Economic Behaviour and Organization, 39, 41–58.
Carson, R., N.E. Flores, and W.M. Haneman (1998). Sequencing and valuing public
goods. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 36, 314–323.
Cummings, Ronald G. and Laura O. Taylor (1999). Unbiased value estimates for environ-
mental goods: A cheap talk design for the contingent valuation method. American
Economic Review , 89, 649–665.
Donaldson, C., P. Schackley, M. Abdalla, and Miedzybrodzka (1995). Willingness to pay
for antenatal screening for cystic fibrosis. Health Economics, 4, 439–452.
Donaldson, C., P. Shackley, and M. Abdalla (1997). Using willingness to pay to
value close substitutes: Carrier screening for cystic fibrosis revisited. Health Eco-
nomics, 6, 145–159.
Ferlay, J., E. Bray, P. Pisani, and D.M. Parkin (2004). Globocan 2002: cancer incidence,
mortality and prevalence worldwide. IARC CancerBase number 5, version 2.0, IARC
Press, Lyon, France.
Guilbert, P., P. Peretti-Watel, F. Beck, and A. Gautier (2006). Baromètre cancer 2005.
Saint-Denis: INPES, Technical report.
Hoehn, J.P. and A. Randall (1989). Too many proposals pass the benefit cost test.
American Economic Review , 70, 544–551.
Hsee, C.K. (1996). The evaluability hypothesis: an explanation for preference reversals
between joint and separate evaluations of alternatives. Organizational Behaviour
and Human Decision Processes, 67, 247–245.
Hsee, C.K. (1998). Less is better: when low-value options are valued more highly than
high value options. Journal of Behavioural Decision Making , 11, 107–121.
Johannesson, M. and B. Fegeberg (1992). A health-economic comparison of diet and
drug treatment in obese men with mild hypertension. Journal of Hypertension, 10,
1063–1070.
17
K., Blumenschein, G.C. Blomquist, M. Johannesson, N. Horn, and P. Freeman (2008).
Eliciting willingness to pay without bias: evidence from a field experiment. Eco-
nomic Journal, 118, 114–137.
Kahneman, D. and I. Ritov (1994). Determinants of stated preference for public goods:
a study in the headline method. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty , 9, 5–38.
Luchini, S., C. Protière, and JP. Moatti (2003). Eliciting several willingness to pay
in a single contingent valuation survey: application to health care. Health Eco-
nomics, 12, 51–64.
Olsen, JA. and C. Donaldson (1998). Helicopters, hearts and hips: Using willingness to
pay to set priorities for public sector health care programmes. Social Science and
Medicine, 46, 1–12.
Olsen, JA., C. Donaldson, P. Shackley, and the EuroWill Group (2005). Implicit versus
explicit ranking: on inferring ordinal preferences for health care programmes based
on differences in willingness-to-pay. Journal of Health Economics, 24, 990–996.
Payne, J. W., D. A. Schkade, W.H. Desvouges, and C. Aultman (2000). Valuation of
multiple environmental programs. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty , 21, 95–115.
Protière, C., C. Donaldson, J.P. Moatti, S. Luchini, and P. Shackley (2004). The impact
of information on non-health attributes on willingness to pay for multiple health
care programmes. Social Science & Medecine, 58, 1257–1269.
Ryan, M., J. Ratchliffe, and J. Tucker (1997). Using willingness to pay to value alter-
native models of antenatal care. Social Science and Medicine, 44, 371–380.
Stewart, J., E. O’Shea, C. Donaldson, and P. Shackley (2002). Do ordering effects matter
in willingness to pay studies of health care? Journal of Health Economics, 21, 585–
599.
18
A Scenarios
“We are going to talk about colorectal cancer. It’s the most frequent cancer. It occurred
at 70 years old in average and is at the origin of more than 16 000 death by year. This
cancer could be hereditary, but is also favored by a too rich alimentation or a lack of
exercise.”
The “screening” programme A
A screening made every two years among the more than 50 years old would allow to
decrease the mortality rate by colorectal cancer of 18% and to avoid some radiotherapy
and chemotherapy to patients. This screening consists in the search of blood in selle,
and if necessary followed by a coloscopy
The “new treatment” programme B
A new kind of chemotherapy allows to reduce the cases of death or relapse from 26
to 21 persons on 100. However this new chemotherapy is more toxic and could induce
an hospitalization in nearly 10 on 100 patients.
The “rehabilitation” programme C
The aim of this programme is to help rehabilitation of people who have been cured
for a colorectal cancer by making available a ?home aid? and by reimbursing prosthesis
and accessories needed to have a “normal life” (wig, ...)
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B Sample characteristics
Variable name Variables description Contributors Protestors Total
(n=2628) (n=1042) (n=3670)
SEX Male ** 1102 (41.9%) 398 (38.2%) 1500 (40.9%)
AGE Mean age (SD) ** 42.35 ( 17.9) 49.05 ( 16.6) 44.25 ( 17.8)
NBPERS Number of person in household (SD) ** 2.73 ( 1.4) 2.48 ( 1.3) 2.66 ( 1.4)
NB16 Number of person in household aged 16 or over (SD) ** 2.10 ( 0.9) 1.94 ( 0.8) 2.05 ( 0.9)
DIP1 No diploma. Primary school. Professional certificate (SD) 1370 (52.1%) 546 (52.4%) 1916 (52.2%)
DIP2 Secondary 451 (17.2%) 173 (16.6%) 624 (17.0%)
DIP3 High school certificate 565 (21.5%) 229 (22.0%) 794 (21.6%)
DIP4 University degree 236 (9.0%) 90 (8.6%) 326 (8.9%)
MDEALT Occupational status in medical environment 175 (6.7%) 58 (5.6%) 233 (6.3%)
EMPL Being in professional activity ** 1389 (52.9%) 604 (58.0%) 1993 (54.3%)
INCOME Mean household monthly income AC(SD) 2083 ( 1240) 2107 ( 1202) 2090 ( 1229)
RURAL Living in a rural area 758 (28.9%) 313 (30.2%) 1071 (29.2%)
MUTUELD Has subscribed a private (for-profit or not-for-profit) 2409 (91.7%) 983 (94.3%) 3392 (92.4%)
health insurance in addition to Social Security coverage**
VACGRIP Being vaccinated against grippe** 532 (20.2%) 256 (24.6%) 788 (21.5%)
SMOKER Being a smocker 1246 (47.4%) 463 (44.4%) 1709 (46.6%)
ScoreHB Healthy Behavior Score (0 to 13)* 7.32 ( 2.4) 7.47 ( 2.4) 7.36 ( 2.4)
ScoreNHB Non Healthy Behavior Score (0 to 13)** 1.91 ( 1.5) 2.05 ( 1.5) 1.95 ( 1.5)
ScoreNI Non informed Score (0 to 5)* 1.01 ( 1.3) 1.11 ( 1.4) 1.04 ( 1.3)
FAMILYK Having member of family with cancer 1501 (57.1%) 589 (56.5%) 2090 (56.9%)
HERED Having a parent or a grand parent 273 (10.4%) 106 (10.2%) 379 (10.3%)
who had a colorectal cancer
EXPHEMO Having experimented an Hemoccult test ** 342 (13%) 174 (16.7%) 516 (14.1%)
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